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ABSTRACT 
Cryptography in the D igital A ge
by
Thomas R. Hodge, Jr.
Dr. A rthur Baragar, Exam ination Committee Chair 
Professor of M athem atical Sciences 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Despite it not being an armed conflict between nations, there is a war th a t has been 
waged for over 5000 years and is still being fought today. Battles have been won and lost by 
both sides. The battlefield is the world of cryptography. Our com batants are cryptographers, 
personnel who make secret codes; and cryptanalysts, personnel who try  to  break the secret 
codes.
In this thesis, we examine public-key or asymmetric cryptography, the a rt of writing 
or deciphering secret codes or ciphers. We begin by taking a brief look at the overall his­
tory of cryptography. Our prim ary focus involves studying the m athematics behind today’s 
public-key cryptographic m ethods such as the theory of congruences by Carl Friedrich Causs, 
Ferm at’s little theorem, Euler’s phi-function, primitive roots and indices, and elliptic curves 
over finite fields. Once we have explored the preliminaries we will consider some of the more 
popular m ethods of encryption and decryption, for example RSA. We not only discuss how 
to  encrypt and decrypt plain tex t using these m ethods but explain why it is hard to break 
the encrypted text. We conclude our study by inspecting the shortfalls of these ciphers, 
techniques used to break the encryption, and what the future possibly holds.
Ill
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CH APTER 1
HISTORY OE CRYPTOCRAPHY 
Commonly Used Words
Cryptography is a modern word derived from two Creek words “A;n/p<o” meaning secret 
or hidden and “^ra/o” meaning to  write. However, cryptography is not modern, it started  
over 4000 years ago with the Egyptians. Before we discuss some of the m ethods used over 
the centuries we need a few definitions to  make our journey easier.
The first word we need to  define is plaintext. P laintext is unencrypted text which is what 
we are currently reading. The second definition is ciphertext which is plaintext th a t has been 
encrypted. The process used to encrypt plaintext into ciphertext or vice versa is called a 
cipher. Finally to  reverse the process of encryption is called decryption.
As we look over cryptography timeline. Tables 1.1-1.3, we focus on a few of the more 
interesting events of cryptography. For a more in depth view of the history of cryptography 
a superb choice is The Codebreakers, The Story o f Secret Writing by David Kahn [11] or with 
the online History o f Cryptography by SecureTrust [22]. We begin our venture into history 
with the Spartans.
Skytale
The Spartans were one of the first civilizations to  use cryptography for m ilitary purposes. 
They used a cipher called a skytale. A skytale consists of a wooden dowel or m etal rod with a 
known diam eter and a strip of parchm ent around half inch in width. A Spartan commander
1
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would take the parchm ent and wrap it around the dowel without overlapping. The message 
would then be w ritten lengthwise down the dowel, the parchment would be removed, and 
the ciphertext would be sent to  the troops. As seen below in Figure 1.1 the plaintext 
reads: SEND MORE TROOPS TO SOUTHERN FLANK AND VICTORY IS OURS. The 
ciphertext reads: STSFVSEROLIONOUACUDOTNTRM PHKOSOSEARRTRNYEONDI.
Figure 1.1: Skytale
Caesar’s Cipher
The next advance in cryptography happened about 400 years later around 50 BC. Julius 
Caesar and the Roman Empire were in need of a way to securely communicate with their 
troops. Caesar developed several cryptographic m ethods but the most famous is a simple 
substitution cipher, the Caesar Cipher. The cipher worked by shifting each letter of the 
Roman alphabet three places as seen in Figure 1.2.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Plaintext:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Ciphertext:
D E E C H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C  
Figure 1.2: The Caesar Cipher
If we take our previous example from the Spartans, the plaintext would again read: SEND 
MORE TROOPS TO SOUTHERN FLANK AND VICTORY IS OURS. The ciphertext us­
ing Caesar’s cipher would read: VHQC PRUH W URRSV W R VRXW KHUQ lODQN DQC 
YLFRWUB LV RXUV. Although lacking the complexity of today’s modern ciphers, monoal- 
phabetic ciphers like Caesar’s cipher remained the norm for hundreds of years. Although 
there were many advances in the world of cryptography after Caesar’s cipher, we are going 
to fast foward through tim e to  the s ta rt of World War II. This is when history saw one of 
the greatest uses of polyalphabetic ciphers.
World War II
W hen people th ink of World War II and cryptography the first thing th a t usnally comes 
to  mind is the Cerm an Enigma cipher. However, despite being the last C reat War to  end 
all wars. World War II was not a era for new cryptographic methods. Germ any’s Enigma, 
Japan’s Purple, America’s M-209, B ritain’s TypeX, and other rotor cipher machines were 
invented between the two great wars. Even the famous Navajo Code-Talkers were initially 
formed during World War I. So why would we want to  look at this era? It produced one 
invention th a t has changed the way we live today, the computer.
The ciphertext produced using rotor cipher machines was believed to  be unbreakable. A
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rotor cipher machine used a similar system to Caesar’s cipher, substitution. However, un­
like the Caesar cipher, the substitution continually changed thus making it a polyalphabetic 
cipher. The complexity (number of rotors) and the initial setup had an incomprehensible 
number of variations leading most to  say the ciphertext could not be broken. Young m ath­
ematicians from the Polish Cipher Bureau, M arian Rejewski, Henryk Zygalski, and Jerzy 
Rozycki, were the first to  show how to  break the Enigma cipher. It was soon discovered that, 
to  decrypt the information in tim e for it to have value, a faster process must evolve. W hat 
they needed was a machine to  defeat the machine. Rejewski first invented the cyclometer 
and later the “bombes” to  autom ate the process of decryption of Enigma traffic. These were 
the very first types of computers, devices to  perform m athem atical or logical operations and 
display the results of those operations.
Breaking the Enigma gave the Allies a tactical advantage but they still lacked a strategic 
edge. The Axis used the Lorenz rotor machine, not the Enigma, for high-level messages. In 
1944, it was the British a t Bletchley Park th a t gave birth  to one of the first programmable 
computers. Colossus. The rough dimension of each Colossus was 50 feet long, 8 feet high, 
and 3 feet wide. In a m atter of hours. Colossus could decrypt messages th a t would take 
cryptanalysts weeks to  do by hand. Colossus was used to  defeat the Lorenz cipher, thus 
giving the Allies an eye on the inner workings of the Axis leaders, including Hitler. Although 
computers like Colossus were built in the latter stages of World War II, it would take another 
invention in 1959 to  transfigure computers, the integrated circuit.
The Dawn of a New Age
W ith the development of computers, like Colossus, the world of cryptography was forever 
changed. However, it would take two events in recent history to  hasten a new age in cryp­
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tography. The first was the advent of the integrated circuit in 1959. Before the integrated 
circuit, computers could easily fill a large room making it improbable for individual owner­
ship. The integrated circuit changed the face of our world in less than  twenty years; making 
computers compact, transportable, and faster. As computers went from just governmental 
use, to corporations, and finally the mainstream, a need was rising for secure communica­
tions. Until 1976, the only way to  encrypt information was to use a symmetric-key cipher. 
Symmetric-key cryptography required both  the sender and receiver to  know the cipher. If 
one posses the key (cipher), they would have the ability to  encrypt and decrypt the message. 
This process works fine if there are a limited number of people using the cipher. However, it 
becomes cost prohibitive to  distribute symmetric-keys for encryption to  the general public.
In 1976, Dr. M artin Heilman and Whitfield Diffie from Stanford University proposed 
the second event th a t forever changed cryptography, a m ethod for public-key cryptography 
or asymmetric-key cryptography as seen in Figure 1.3. These codes are called asymmetric 
because having the ability to encrypt a message does not mean one has the ability to  decrypt 
the message. Thus, it was quite simple; two interrelated keys were needed, one public 
(encryption key) and one private (decryption key). The best part of this system was th a t 
there was no need to  distribute keys. The public key is used for encryption and generally 
made available to  whomever requires the need for secure communications. The private key 
is used for decryption and not distributed to  the public. One year later, the first of many 
public-key cryptographic systems was produced. This will be our focus: the m athematics 
th a t makes up public-key cryptography, common public-key cryptographic systems, what 
makes them  secure, and finally what the future might hold for cryptography.
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Table 1.1: Cryptography Timeline 1900 BC - 1863
Cryptography Timeline
Year Cipher Remarks
1900 BC Hieroglyphics Hieroglyphic symbols were used by the Egyptians 
for religious purposes and to  record the history 
of pharaohs. Although the writing was not kept 
secret, it gave b irth  to  cryptography by transform ­
ing words to  symbols.
1500 BC Cuneiform Mesopotamians used cuneiform writing to  protect 
trade secrets like pottery glazing.
600 BC Atbash Hebrew scribes used the atbash cipher to  write 
various parts of the book Jeremiah in the Old 
Testament. The cipher was a simple substitu­
tion cipher: the last letter of the Hebrew alpha­
bet replaced the first and conversely, the second 
replaced the next to  last and conversely, etc.
486 BC Skytale The Spartans, m ilitary leaders of the Greeks, 
were the first to  develop and employ cryptogra­
phy solely for m ilitary purposes.
50 BC Caesar A simple substitution cipher shifting each letter 
in the alphabet by three places. Any cipher tha t 
uses this similar m ethod (shift by four, shift by 
five, ...) bears the name, Caesar Cipher.
1000 Monoalphabetic Frequency analysis, determ ination of how often a 
letter is used in a specific language, developed as 
a technique to  break monoalphabetic substitution 
ciphers.
1466 Cipher Disk Leon B attista  Alberti, “The Father of W estern 
Cryptography” , developed a cipher disk and cryp­
tographic key using a polyalphabetic substitution.
1587 Vigenere A polyalphabetic substitution cipher using a short 
repeating keyword named for Blaise de Vigenere.
1753 Telegraph Invention of the telegraph was one of the first steps 
in modern cryptography.
1845 Morse Code Samuel Morse creates Morse Code, one of the first 
digital communications.
1863 Vigenere Prussian M ajor Kariski proposed a m ethod to 
break the Vigenere cipher.
Continued on next page...
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Table 1.2: Cryptography Timeline 1883 - 1952
Cryptography Timeline
Year Cipher Remarks
1883 Auguste Kerckhotf publishes his six principals for 
m ilitary cryptography:
1. The system should be theoretically unbreak­
able.
2. Compromise of the system should not inconve­
nience the correspondents.
3. The key should be rememberable w ithout notes 
and easily changeable.
4. The cryptograms should be transmissible by 
telegraph.
5. System should be portable and operated by a 
single person.
6. System should be easy.
1917 The Zimmermann Telegram deciphered by British 
Intelligence brought the United States into World 
War I.
1918 ADFGVX A unique cipher used by the Germans during 
World War I th a t used only the letters ADFGVX 
for all 26 letters of the alphabet.
1918 Enigma A rthur Scherbius originally designed the Enigma 
for confidential business communications.
1937 Rotor Machines Commonly used devices during World War II:
Germany - Enigma
Japan - Purple
US - SIGABA, M-209
Britain - TypeX
1945 Navajo Code Talkers The Navajo language was used by the US to trans­
mit vital information on Iwo Jim a during W W  II.
1940's First Computers Zuse Z3 - 1941 
Atanasotf-Berry - 1941 
Colossus - 1944 
Harvard Mark I - 1944 
ENIAC - 1946
1952 NSA President Truman created the National Security 
Agency in 1952.
Continued on next page...
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Table 1.3; Cryptography Timeline 1970 - Present
Cryptography Timeline
Year Cipher Remarks
1959 Integrated Circuit Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce developed the inte­
grated circuit revolutionizing the computer indus- 
try.
1968 John Walker The s ta rt of John Walker’s 17 years of espionage 
for the Soviets.
1971 Lucifer Developed by Horst Feistel, it was a simple block 
cipher th a t was the predecessor to  the D ata En­
cryption Standard (DES). DES was implemented 
as a standard in 1976.
1974 The National Institu te of Standards and Technol­
ogy was created.
1975 Microsoft The s ta rt up of Microsoft by Bill Gates and Paul 
Allen.
1976 Dithe-Hellman Public-key cryptography using a discrete loga­
rithm  proposed by Dr. M artin Heilman of Stan­
ford University and Whitfield Ditfie.
1977 RSA Three individuals from MIT, Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, conceived of an 
asymmetric public-key cryptograph system based 
on factoring a composite number into two exact 
prime numbers.
1983 Orange Book DoD STD 5200.28 Trusted Com puter System 
Evaluation Criteria replaced by the ISO 15408 in 
2005.
1987 RC4 A stream  cipher used to  secure wireless networks, 
internet communication, and point-to-point com­
munication.
1991 PG P Phil Zimmermann created Pretty-G ood-Privacy 
program to fill the needs of everyday nsers to  en­
crypt information.
1998 DES Deep Crack - The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
cracked the DES algorithm.
2002 AES Advanced Encryption Standard replaces DES as 
the new encryption method.
2007 Quantum  Computer The world’s first commercial quantum  computer 
dem onstrated publicly by D-Wave Systems, Inc. 
on 13 Eeb 2007.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CH APTER 2
MATHEMATICS
Preliminaries
Since cryptography has become a combination of mathematics and computer science, we 
need to  set the boundaries the two sides can easily work with and understand. The first 
boundary is the set of integers, { . . . ,  -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 ,3 , . . . } ;  common notation is Z. The 
second is a subset of the first, the set of natural numbers, {1, 2, 3, ...} ; common notation 
is N. Though 0 is considered by some to  be a natural number, we will adopt the convention 
th a t it is not in our set. Now th a t we have set the boundaries, we can state  our first theorem, 
the Division Algorithm;
T h e o re m  1 (Division Algorithm). Let a €  Z and 6 G N. Then there exist unique t ,  r  E Z 
satisfying the equation:
a = kb + r where 0 < r < b (2.1)
Proof. F irst, let S =  {a +  ; a +  >  0, i G Z}. Then by the Well-Ordering Principle
there exists a smallest element of S , call it r. We know that r — a — kb for some t  E Z, 
therefore we have a ~  kb + r.
If we do not have r < b, then we have the case r > b and we get the following;
a — (/l -|- 1) 6 =  a — kb — b
{a — kb) — b = r — b > 0.
10
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However this implies a -  {k + l )b  =  r — b < r, which leads us to  a contradiction of the
choice of r as the smallest integer, thus r < b.
Second, we must show th a t k  and r  are unique. Let a = kib + ri where 0 < < b and
a = k 2 b + r 2  where 0 < T2  < b. Observe the following two equations:
0 <  r i =  a — kib, (2 .2)
0 <  f 2 =  a — k2b. (2.3)
Subtracting equation 2.3 from equation 2.2 we get the following:
{t \ — ^2 ) =  b {k 2  — k i ) .
Since ri and rg < 6 implies |ri — r2 \ < b, we have b\k2  — ki\ < b. We conclude th a t ki =  ^2 
because the only solution for 0 <  1^ 2 ~  I  < 1 is 0 seeing th a t \k2  — k f  is a non-negative 
integer. Thus k  and r are unique. □
We note th a t in Equation 2.1, if r  =  0, then Theorem 1 implies a =  kb. Equation 2.1 
and Theorem 1 gives us two im portant definitions as seen below.
D efinition 1 (Divisor). If a =  A:6 from Equation 2.1 then we say 5 is a divisor of a or a is 
a multiple of b, denoted by b\a.
D efinition 2 (Greatest Common Divisor). Let a ,6 G Z, with either a /  0 or 6 7^  0. The 
greatest common divisor of a and 6, denoted gcd (a, 6), is a positive integer d th a t satisfies:
1. d\a and d\b.
2. If c|a and c|6, then c < d.
11
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D efinition 3 (Least Common Multiple). Let u, 6 E Z, with a f  0 and b f  0. The least 
common multiple of a and b, denoted 1cm (a, 6), is a positive integer m  th a t satisfies:
1. a |m  and 6|m.
2. If o|c and 6|c (c > 0), then m  < c.
Theorem  2 (Linear Combination). Let a, 6 E Z, with either a f  0 or b f  0. The smallest 
positive integer of the form ax  +  by, for  some x, y E Z, is d =  gcd (a, b).
Proof. Let S  = {ax + by : x, y & Z, ax + by > 0} and d = min S.
1. Suppose d is not a divisor of a, then by the division algorithm we know a = kd P  r 
where 0 < r < d. Solving for r we get the following:
r = a — kd = a — k {ax +  by) =  a (1 -  kx)  +  b {—ky)
This contradicts the fact we choose d = min 5, so d\a. Similarly, we get d\b. Thus d is 
a common divisor.
2. Suppose c|a and c\b. Then c|ax +  by for all x ,y .  In particular c\d, therefore a < d. 
Thus d = gcd (a, b). □
This is an existance proof, however it does not provide a way to  compute x  and y. To do 
th a t we use the Euclidean algorithm. First, let us explain how the algorithm works before 
we prove it. Let d = gcd (a, 6) be our desired outcome. Since gcd(|o |, |6|) = gcd (a, 6), we 
can assume without loss of generality 0 < b < a. Applying the Division Algorithm to a and 
b we get
a = kib +  Ti where 0 < n  < 6.
12
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If ri — 0 then we can stop and the gcd (a, b) — b. If 0 then  we continue the process 
until a zero remainder appears. This produces a system of equations:
a — kib + ri 0 <  r i <  b
b = k2ri +  T2 0 < T2 < ri
ri = ksr2 +  rs 0 <  rs <  T2 (2.4)
r’n—2 — kjiTji—i T  3 P Tji Vji—i
r’n - l  — k j i + l T j i  +  0
We are assured th a t the sequence has finite number of steps no more than  b, because b > 
ri > r2 >  • • • >  0 is a decreasing sequence. Thus our claim is the last nonzero remainder, 
= d = gcd (a, b). We prove this with the following theorem.
Lemma 3. I f  given a = kb + r, then gcd (a, b) = gcd {b, r).
Proof. Let d = gcd (a, b) and d = gcd (b, r). We will show d < d and d < d.
1. d\d. We are given d = gcd (a, b). Thus d\a and d\b. This implies d\ {a — kb) = r. Since
d =  gcd (6, r), we have d < d.
2. d\d. We are given d = gcd (6, r). Thus d\b and d\r. This impies d\ {kb + r) — a. Since
d =  gcd (a, b), we have d < d. □
By applying Lemma 3 repeatedly in the Euclidean algorithm, we get
d = gcd{a,b) =  gcd (6, n )  =  gcd ( n , r 2) =  • ■ • =  gcd (r,,_ i,r„) =  g c d (r„ ,0) =  r„.
To get a solution to  ax + by = d, we work back through the equations in 2.4. This is best
13
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illustrated with an example. Let us now take a look at how the algorithm works by finding 
gcd (16380,43).
16380 =  43 • fc +  r  
16380 =  43 - 380 +  40
43 =  40 • 1 +  3 
40 =  3 - 1 3 + 1  
3 =  1 - 3  +  0
Therefore the gcd (16380,43) =  1, so 1 now can be w ritten as a linear combination of 16380 
and 43. We s ta rt with the equation 40 =  3 - 13 +  1 and work our way back through system 
of equations eliminating the remainders.
1 =  40 -  (3 - 13)
=  40 -  (13 - (43 -  (40 -1))) 
=  1 4 - 4 0 - 1 3 - 4 3  
=  14 - (16380 -  43 - 380) -  13 - 43
=  14-16380-5333-43  (2.5)
It is obvious th a t gcd (16380, 43) =  1, because 43 is a prime number. However, the point 
of the example was to  show th a t using the algorithm gives us a way to  write the gcd as a 
linear combination. Furthermore for our purposes, the algorithm is efficient, requiring at 
most 2 log2 n steps [20, page 265]. W ith the preliminaries out of the way, we are now ready 
to  embark on modular arithm etic introduced by Carl Friedrich Gauss in 1801 [4].
14
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Theory of Congruences 
One of the first observations th a t Gauss made is with Equation 2.1. The equation could 
be rew ritten as a —r = kb and from th a t we can conclude 6| (a — r). This led to  his definition 
of congruence as seen in Definition 4:
D efinition 4 (Congruence). Let a,b E Z  and n E N. The integers a and b are said to be 
congruent modulo n, denoted by equation
a = b mod n, (2 .6)
if and only if n| (a — 6); th a t is to  say a — b = kn for some /c E Z.
D efinition 5 (The Set Z„). Let Z„ =  {0, • ■ • ,n  — 1}. For every a E Z, a = b mod n  for
some 6 E Z„; thus Z„ is the set of representatives of Z modulo n.
We also can derive the following properties for Equation 2.6 assuming a, 6, c, d E Z:
1. a =  a mod n (Reflexive).
2. li  a = b mod n, then b = a mod n (Symmetric).
3. If a =  6 mod n and b = c mod n, then a = c mod n (Transitive).
4. If a =  6 mod n and c = d mod n, then (a +  c) =  (6 +  d) mod n (Addition).
5. l i  a = b mod n and c = d mod n, then {a — c) = {b — d) mod n.
6. If o =  5 mod n  and c = d mod n, then ac = bd mod n (Multiplication).
7. l i  a = b mod n, then =  6* mod n, for any given A: E N.
Proof. We will prove 1, 2, and 4; proofs for the others can be found in most beginning number 
theory books [4]. (Note: 4* denotes if and only if.)
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1. Given any a € Z, we have a — a =  0 • n  thus a = a  mod n.
2. Given a = b mod n ,  we have
a  = b mod n <;+ n | (a — 6)
+> n| — (a — 6)
4P n \ { b  — a)
4P b = a  mod n.
4. Given a =  6 mod n, we have
a =  b mod n  4P n \ { a  — b)
4P {a — b) = k i n  for some k i  E Z. (2.7)
Also given c = d  mod n ,  we have
c = d  mod n  4P n \ { c  — d)
4P {c — d.) = k 2 n  for some A:; E  Z. (2.8)
Adding equations 2.7 and 2.8 we get the following:
(a — 6) +  (c — d) =  k i n  +  Agn 4P {a + c) — {b + d) = {ki  + Acg) n
n\ { a p e )  — (6  +  d)
4P {a P c )  = { h p d )  mod n.
16
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Another observation made by Gauss is his theorem of Linear Congruence.
Theorem  4 (Linear Congruence). The equation ax = b mod n has a solution i f  and only 
i f  gcd (a, n) \b.
Proof. (=>) Suppose ax = b mod n. Then n\ax — b.
^  ax — b = n k  for some fc G Z 
ax — n k  = b.
Since d\a and d\n, we get d\b.
(<=) Suppose d = gcd (a, n). Then there exists s , t  g Z  such th a t as + n t  = d. If d\b, then 
there exists fe G Z such th a t b = dk.
=> ask + n tk  = dk = b 
^  X = sk  is a solution.
Thus, we have ax =  b mod n <=> gcd (a, n)\b. □
Corollary 5 (Inverse). I f  gcd {a, n) =  I, then a~^ exists.
Proof. By Theorem 4, we can solve ax = 1 mod n. Then the solution is a “ L □
Corollary 6 (Cancellation). I f  gcd (c, n) =  1 and ca =  cb mod n, then a = b mod n.
Proof. We are given gcd (c, n) =  1, so we know c~^ exists.
ca = cb mod n => c~^ca =  c~^cb mod n ^  a = b mod n. □
17
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D efinition 6 (The Set Z*). Let Z* =  {a € Z„ : gcd(a, n) =  1}. This is the set of a € Z„ 
such th a t the equation ax =  1 mod n  has a solution.
Gauss made other several significant contributions to  the field of number theory, bu t we 
are now ready to  discuss Ferm at’s little theorem. To avoid confusion, we adopt Gauss’s 
notation for congruences throughout the rest of this paper.
Ferm at’s Little Theorem
Although Pierre de Fermat was born over 150 years earlier than  Gauss, he too made 
significant contributions to  number theory. Fermat made the following observation about 
prime numbers as seen in Table 2.1, this led to  his little theorem.
Theorem  7 (Ferm at’s little Theorem). Let p be a prime number and a E Zp where a 0. 
Then
=  1 mod p. (2.9)
Corollary 8 (Converse of Theorem 7). I f  oT ^  a mod n for some a, then n is not prime.
Note th a t equation 2.9 can be w ritten as aP =  a mod p thereby eliminating the re­
quirement of a 7^  0. We will not prove Ferm at’s little Theorem at this moment, we will 
prove a more general case by Euler later. But as we can see in Table 2.1, the theorem  works 
wonderfully.
Ferm at’s little Theorem has several applications in the field of number theory. To say the 
least, it can be used to  simplify numbers to  a large power congruent modulo some prime. It 
can be used to  solve linear congruences like ax* =  b mod p or x* =  6 mod p. We concluded 
this section with one im portant application of Ferm at’s little Theorem, the so-called “Fermat 
prim ality tes t” of a given number as seen in Corollary 8. One im portant fact about the test
18
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is th a t if a" =  a mod n, it does not guarantee n is prime. There exist numbers where the 
test fails to  show they are composite. These numbers are rare (compared to primes) and 
Ferm at’s test can be used as an initial first step to  determine if a number is prime. However, 
this is why we should take care in calling it a composite test rather than  a prim ality test.
Table 2.1: Congruence of Prime Numbers
%  =  { 0,1,2 } Zs =  { 0,1,2,3,4 } -  { 0,1,2,3,4,5,6 }
2 = 2  mod 3 
2  ^ =  1 mod 3 <^=
2 = 2  mod 5 
2  ^ =  1 mod 5 -4=
2 = 2  mod 7 
2  ^ =  1 mod 7 <J=
3 = 3  mod 5 
3  ^ =  1 mod 5 <=
3 = 3  mod 7 
3® =  1 mod 7 <=
4 = 4  mod 5 
4  ^ =  1 mod 5
4 = 4  mod 7 
4  ^ =  2 mod 7 
4  ^ =  1 mod 7 <4=
5 = 5  mod 7 
5® =  1 mod 7 -4=
6 = 6  mod 7 
6  ^ =  1 mod 7 <4=
We have covered the basics needed to  understand the m athematics used in public-key 
cryptography. For each cipher we study, we will need to  cover more m athematics, bu t we 
will postpone covering th a t background until needed. So, let us look at our first cipher, RSA.
19
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CH A PTER 3 
RSA
Euler’s Phi-function
Leonhard Euler was one of the greatest m athem aticians of the 18th centnry. He too, like 
Fermat, made considerable and noteworthy contributions to  the field of number theory. Our 
focus is on Euler’s generalization of Ferm at’s little Theorem. We start by defining Euler’s 
phi-function, how to calculate it, and finally the generalization of Ferm at’s theorem.
D efinition 7 (Euler’s Phi-function). We set </) (n) =  |Z*|. T hat is to  say the function 
denotes the number of positive integers not greater than  n  th a t are relatively prime to n.
Note th a t if n  is a prime number p then every positive integer less than  p is relatively 
prime to  p. So (j) (p) =  p —1. Now th a t we have defined Euler’s function we need to  know how 
to calculate it for any n >  1. We will need to  recall the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, 
th a t every positive integer (n >  1) can be expressed as a unique product of primes. We are 
not going to  prove them , but the next three im portant theorems allow ns to  calcnlate Euler’s 
function (Proofs can be found in Bnrton, [4, pages 131-135]).
Theorem  9 (Prime Powers). I f  p is a prime and k > 0, then (j) { j f)  =  p*" — p*'“ F
Theorem  10 (M ultiplicative). The phi-function is multiplicative, meaning i f  gcd (m, n) =  1, 
then (f> {run) ~  (f> {m) (f> (n).
Proof. Special case; Suppose p and q are distinct primes. Let n = pq and a G Z„. If 
gcd(o, n) 7^  1, then either p |a  or q\a. There are q values of a G Z„ such th a t pja, namely
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{0,p, 2p, • • • ,{q — l)p}- Similarly, the set of multiples of q is {0, q,2q,-- ■ , (p — 1) q}.
Suppose kp = Iq for some A; G {0, • • • , g — 1} and / G {0, ■ • • , p — 1}. Then p\l =P I = 0 
k = 0. So, the overlap is 0. This implies
(p{n) = (p (pq) = p q - p - q  + l
=  ( p -  ! ) ( ( ? -  1)
□
This special case of the multiplicative property of f  (n) is the one which we most often
use.
Corollary 11 (Prime Factorization). Given n = p \^p^  "  'Pr'' and n > 1, then
(n) =  -  P ^ -') . . .  (p^ -  p ^ -:) . (3.1)
We have defined and learned how to solve Euler’s phi-function. Our final objective is to 
state Euler’s theorem, a generalization of Ferm at’s little theorem. Before we state  Euler’s 
theorem, we need to  recall Corollary 6; if gcd (c, n) =  1 and ca =  cb mod n, then a = b 
mod n.
T h e o re m  12 (Euler’s Theorem). Let n >  I. I f  gcd {a, n) =  1, then =  1 mod n.
Proof. Let { a i,a 2, • • • ,u^(n)} =  Z*. Let 6, be the unique integer such th a t aoi =  6, mod n, 
0 < bi < n. Since gcd(a, n) =  gcd (a,, n) =  1, we know gcd(6j,n ) =  1, so 6, G Z*. Thus
{ 6 i ,  6 2 ,  • • • , b<t>{n)} Q  Z * .
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If bi = bj mod n for some i ^  j ,  then  an, =  aaj mod n. So by cancellation, o, =  aj 
mod n and therefore a* =  aj, a contradiction. Thus bi ^  bj mod n, so {61, 62, "  , 6^(»)} =  
Z*. T hat is aoi, au2, • • • , aa^(n) =  61, 62, - - , 6^(„) mod n in some order. If we m ultiply 
these congruences we get the following;
(aai) (002) • • • (aa0(„)) =  6162 • • • 6^(„) mod n 
(a i02 - - - a^(n)) ^  «1(12 - «,^ (71) mod n
Since gcd (a*,n) =  1, we can cancel, so =  1 mod n. □
Note th a t Euler’s theorem implies Ferm at’s theorem; if n  is a prime p, then =  1 
mod p => = 1 mod p, which is Equation 2.9.
RSA Cipher
The most well known public-key cryptographic system is RSA. RSA was developed by 
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman one year after Diffe-Hellman’s proposal of 
asymmetric-key cryptography. RSA works because it is easy to  multiply two prime numbers 
together bu t difficult to  factor a number. Let us explore how the cipher works.
Theorem  13 (RSA Algorithm). IFe are going to break the algorithm into three parts: the 
key generation, the encryption process, and the decryption process. The flow of the system  
can be seen in Figure 1.3 page 6.
1. The key generation:
(a) Choose two large random, and distinct primes p and q. (Note p and q should be at 
least 100 digits.)
(b) Compute n = pq.
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(c) Compute (j) (n) = {p — 1) {q — 1).
(d) Choose a random integer e, such that 1 < e < 4>{n) and gcd (e, 4> (n)) =  1.
(e) Compute the unique integer d, such that 1 < d < 4>{n) and e d = l  mod
(f) The public key is n  and e; the private key is d. (Note the numbers p, q, and 4> in) 
must be kept secret.)
2. Encryption:
(a) Bob obtains Alice’s public key n and e.
(b) Bob converts his message to an integer m , such that 0 < m  < n — 1. I f  the
message is larger than n, it can be broken down into pieces such that each piece
is within the range. However, each piece m i, m 2, • • • , m, will have to be encrypted 
seperately.
(c) Bob computes E  = mod n.
(d) Bob sends the ciphertext, E , to Alice.
3. Decryption:
(a) Alice receives the ciphertext E  from Bob.
(h) Alice computes m  = E'^ mod n where 0 < m < n  — 1 to decipher the text.
(c) Alice converts the integer into text.
Proof We are given gcd (e, </> (n)) =  1 and ed =  1 mod We claim then = m
mod n for all m  G Z„. This gives us two cases, gcd (m, n) =  1 and gcd (m, n) 7  ^ 1.
If gcd (m, n) =  1, then Euler’s theorem implies =  1 mod n. We were given ed =  1
mod (f) (n) ed = 1 + k(j) (n) for some /c G Z. Now m ^  =  =  m • = m  ■
=  m -Ÿ ’ mod n. Therefore we get onr resnlt, m ^  =  m  mod n when gcd (m, n) =  1.
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Although this case is extremely rare, decryption works even if gcd (m, n) yt i. If gcd (m, n) /  
1, then  either p\m  and the gcd (q, m) =  1 or q\m and gcd (p, m) =  1. Since both these cases 
are similar and require the same proof we will consider the latter. Now gcd (m, n) = q implies 
q\m and gcd (p, m) = 1, in tu rn  this implies q\m and gcd (p, m^~^) = 1. Since p is prime, if 
we nse Euler’s theorem we get:
(mP~^Y  ^ =  1 mod p 
=  I nrod p 
=  1 mod p
=  m odp (3.2)
M ultiplying both sides of equation 3.2 by m, we get the result =  m mod p when q\m
and gcd (p, m) =  1. By Ferm at’s theorem we know { n f ^ y  = mod q because q is prime.
In this case we have O'? =  0 mod q because q\m, so =  m mod q. Since =  m 
mod p and =  m  mod q, we can conclnde by the Chinese remainder theorem (Proof can 
be found Burton, [4, pages 79-81]) th a t =  m  mod n. Similarly if gcd (m, n) =  p, we get 
msd =  ^  mod n. Therefore m®** =  m  mod n  for all m G Z„. □
We have defined and proved th a t the RSA cipher works in theory. Let us now take a 
look at a simple example and show how the cipher works in practice. After choosing our two 
primes and performing the ground work we will need to  convert our message to  an integer 
value. Every letter and symbol on a digital keyboard is already represented by an integer 
value. However, for our dem onstration we will use Table 3.1 to  convert our message. Now 
let us take a look at an example of the RSA cipher.
1. The key generation:
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(a) Alice chooses p = 127 and q = 131. (For this dem onstration we will not choose 
100 digit primes.)
(b) Alice computes n = pq = 127 • 131 — 16637.
(c) Alice computes (j){n) = (p (16637) =  (127 — 1) (131 — 1) =  16380.
(d) Alice chooses e =  43.
(e) Alice computes ed = 1 mod 4> (n), which is 43d =  1 mod 16380. Going back to 
our example in Chapter 2 on the Euclidean algorithm, Equation 2.5, we find th a t 
d = 11047.
(f) Alice publishes her public key as n =  16637 and e =  43. Keeping p =  127, q = 131, 
and (p{n) = 16380 secret as well as d =  11047, her private key.
2. Encryption:
(a) Bob obtains Alice’s public key, n  =  16637 and e =  43.
(b) Bob converts his message “HI” to  an integer value using Table 3.1, thus m  = 809.
(c) Bob computes E  = rrf mod n; given E  = 809^^ mod 16637.
809  ^ =  809 mod 16637 
809  ^=  5638 mod 16637
809^ =  10374 mod 16637
809® =  11760 mod 16637
809^  ^=  10856 mod 16637
809^  ^=  12865 mod 16637
Note th a t this m ethod of calculating E  is referred to as the square-square method.
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This gives Bob 809^® =  809®^ +®+^ +' =  12865 11760 5638 809 =  1825 mod 16637, 
thus E  = 1825.
(d) Bob sends E  = 1825 to  Alice.
3. Decryption;
(a) Alice receives E  =  1825 from Bob.
(b) Alice computes m  = E'^ mod n using the square-square method. Alice is given 
m =  1825^ »^^ '^  mod 16637.
1825  ^ =  1825 mod 16637
1825  ^=  3225 mod 16637
1825^ =  2500 mod 16637
1825® =  11125 mod 16637
1825^ ® =  2982 mod 16637
1825®^  =  8166 mod 16637
1825®^  =  2460 mod 16637
1825^ ®^ =  12369 mod 16637
1825^ ®® =  14946 mod 16637
1825®^  ^ =  14554 mod 16637
1825^ ®^  ^ =  13269 mod 16637
1 8 2 5 2 0 4 8  =  23Q27 mod 16637
1 8 2 5 4 0 9 ® = mod 16637
1 8 2 5 8 1 9 2  =  g225 mod 16637
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This gives Alice 1825“ ®^  ^ =  i825®i®2+2048+5i2+256+32+4+2+i =  3225 .13527 • 14554 ■ 
14946 ■ 8166 ■ 2500 ■ 3225 • 1825 =  809 mod 16637, thus m =  809.
(c) Alice uses Table 3.1 to  convert the message into text, thus getting 809 — “HI” .
Table 3.1: Integer Value Alphabet
A =  01 B =  02 C =  03 D =  04 E =  05 F =  06 G =  07 H =  08
I =  09 J =  10 K =  11 L =  12 M =  13 N =  14 0  =  15 P =  16
Q =  17 R =  18 S =  19 T =  20 U =  21 V =  22 W =  23 X =  24
Y =  25 Z =  26
Security of RSA
We have stated before th a t the security of RSA lies in the fact th a t it is easy to calculate 
a composite number with two distinct primes but hard to  factor it. Despite not having an 
efficient m ethod to  factor a composite number, we cannot say RSA is invulnerable to  attack. 
We tu rn  our attention to  the various m ethods used to factor n.
Before we s ta rt examining the tim e it takes various methods used to factor n, let us 
recall the greatest common divisor. If we are given two positive integers, m  and n  such 
th a t n < m, then the tim e it takes to  compute the gcd (n, m) using the simplest m ethod of 
divide and check is a t most 2n. Using the common notation of “big O” (See Koblitz, [12, 
page 9]), then we can say it takes 0 { n ) .  Yet in Chapter 2 we discovered a more efficient 
method to  calculating the gcd, it is the Euclidean Algorithm. The tim e it takes for the 
Euclidean Algorithm is O (log n). If we are given a positive integer n, the simplest way 
to  check if it is prime is again the check and divide method. Since we only have to  check
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primes up to  we do O [\fn)  calculations [19]. Modifying this m ethod using only prime 
numbers to  divide and check against n = pq, we can break RSA. This seems qnite feasible 
when we look back on our example; it would take less than  128 steps to  complete. If we 
started  a t 2 and tested using only prime numbers up to  127, we would find th a t it only 
took 31 steps to  break our RSA demonstration. Still, we took the liberty to  modify the 
first step to  show a working example. If we were to choose p  and q such th a t they are at 
least 100 digit prime numbers, then our simple m ethod of trying to break RSA would be 
computationally unrealistic. Various m ethods have been used to  factor numbers less than  
100 digits such as quadratic sieve, Fermat factorization, continued fractions, elliptic curves, 
and the rho method. But, the best tim e th a t any of these methods could produce to  factor 
n is exp (O (y io g n lo g  logn)) [12].
On March 18, 1991 RSA Laboratories developed the RSA Factoring Challenge to  monitor 
the progress in the development of integer factorization methods. RSA-100 through RSA- 
155, integers ranging from 100 to  155 digits composed of two large primes, were cracked 
using either the quadratic sieve or the number field sieve before the year 2000. (Note th a t 
RSA-155, 155 digits, is a 512-bit key.) During this tim e frame a new m ethod of factorization 
was developed, the general number field sieve, and it could handle numbers larger than  155 
digits. The speed of the general number field sieve is exp ^(logn)^^® (loglogn)^'^® [12]. 
Even though this m ethod is faster than  the others and far better than  the brute force m ethod 
of guessing the private-key, it still requires a large amount of computing power and tim e for 
very large integers. W ith these advancements in factoring, RSA ended the challenge in 2007. 
Currently it is recommended to  use key lengths of 1024-bits for general security and 2048-bits 
for more valuable information [19].
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Cryptanalysis
W hat do we do if we are not just dealing with RSA encryption? We m ust use some 
form of cryptanalysis to break the cipher. The first requirement of cryptanalysis is to  have a 
working expertise of the cipher being used. The second requirement is the gathering of the 
plaintext, the ciphertext, or both. This m ethod of trying to break the cipher depends on 
time, patience, knowledge, and sometimes luck. Let us take a look at the four main methods 
used by cryptanalysts:
1. Ciphertext-only attack. This type of attack calls for the cryptanalyst to  have access 
to  several messages th a t have been encrypted using the same cipher. The job is to 
decipher as many of the messages as possible and ultim ately a tta in  the secret keys.
2. Known-plaintext attack. This type of attack the cryptanalyst has access to  both the 
ciphertext and the plaintext. The job is to  retrieve the secret key.
3. Chosen-plaintext attack. This type of attack is very similar to  the known-plaintext 
attack, but it carries a bigger punch. The reason this attack is more powerful is 
because a cryptanalyst can now choose a specific plaintext to  be encrypted. Again the 
supreme goal here is to  procure the secret key.
4. Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack. As the name entails, this attack is similar to the 
last, yet even more powerful. Unlike the last, the cryptanalyst now has the ability to 
vary the length of the plaintext to  be encrypted as well as choose a second plaintext 
to  be encrypted based on the first.
Although these types of attacks on RSA do not work (they are essentially equivalent to  fac­
toring n), they are still useful on other ciphers. We only brushed the surface of cryptanalysis. 
A cryptanalysts carries a variety of other tools in their toolbox including: chosen-ciphertext
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attack, chosen-key attack, rubber-hose cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis, and linear 
cryptanalysis. For more details see Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schnier [21].
As keys get longer, another option to  break the encryption is a side-channel attack. 
This type of attack does not try  to  solve the inverse of a cipher but rather goes after the 
implementation of the cryptographic system. Rather than  just focusing on RSA, side-channel 
attacks can be used to  attem pt to  break most of today’s ciphers. So, what is a side-channel 
attack? The focus of side-channel attack is the tim e it takes to perform the calculations, 
power used during calculations, sound made performing calculations, or electro-magnetic 
radiation. Although this attack is dependent on a lot of variables such as CPU used, type 
of countermeasures used including shielding, accuracy of measuring equipment, and various 
others, it still is a feasible m ethod to  break a cipher. Side-channel attacks allow cryptanalysts 
to  discern information about the secret-key by careful measurement of time, power, sound, or 
electro-magnetic radiation; thereby narrowing their focus on deducing the secret-key. Even 
though this m ethod requires less computing power and time, it still requires analysts to 
interpret the measurements to  comprehend relevant information about the cipher. Ways to 
reduce these attacks include adding delays, power balancing, adding noise, and shielding; 
but in tu rn  this raises the cost, time, or size of the equipment needed to  perform the cipher.
In today’s world, we have become reliant on computers and the internet for entertainm ent, 
communication, and business. We trust corporations to  protect our private information using 
some type of security such as symmetric-key or asymmetric-key cryptography. Indeed if we 
were unable to  break the cipher using the above two methods, we could consider an even more 
simplistic attack bypassing the security of the cipher, an attack on the computer system. 
In partnership with the D epartm ent of Homeland Security, the United States Com puter 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is charged with defending our cyberspace. In 2006,
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US-CERT listed over 450 vulnerabilities th a t could be exploited to  gain unauthorized access 
to  a computer system [24]. The m ajority of these vulnerabilities can be eliminated or the risk 
mitigated. Cyber criminals are not just putting viruses on our computer systems; they are 
using sophisticated tools for phishing, spoofing, and pharming to  try  to  gain access to  our 
personal information. Although this risk is low for individuals, it has been steadily increasing 
over the last few years. We are only covering the surface of this risk because it could lead to 
the compromise of the secret key. Modifying an old proverb we can say th a t cryptography is 
only as strong as its weakest link. In today’s world the weakest link is no longer the cipher, 
but rather the protection of the secret key.
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CH APTER 4
EL GAMAL (ELG)
Primitive Roots and Indices 
Although primitive roots and indices can be defined for any positive integer (though they 
do not always exist) we limit ourselves to  prime numbers when using the EIG cipher. We 
start by defining what a primitive root is. Next, we establish how many primitive roots there 
are for each prime. Finally, we define index and state  three properties used in arithmetic.
D e fin itio n  8 (Order). Let a G Z*. The order of an integer a modulo n is the smallest 
positive integer, k, such th a t = 1 mod n; denoted as ord (a) = k.
D e fin itio n  9 (Primitive Root). Let Z* =  {1,2,3, - - - ,p  — 1}, where p  is prime. If there 
exists a g E Zp such th a t {g\g^,g®, • • • =  Z* (i.e. ord (g) = 4>{p)), then g is called a
primitive root or a generator of Z*.
We soon will discover th a t Z* always has a primitive root.
L e m m a  14. Suppose we are given a polynomial f  (x) that has n distinct roots in Zp. Then 
deg ( /)  >  n.
Proof. We prove this by induction on n.
• Initial case: Suppose /  (x) has one root. This clearly implies deg ( / )  >  1.
• Induction: Let us assume the Lemma is true when n =  A: — 1. Suppose /  (x) has k  
distinct roots { n , - - - , r*,}. We need to show deg ( / )  >  k. Since /  (r*,) =  0 mod p, we
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know {x -  rk) \ f  {x). This implies /  (x) = [x -  r^) g (x) mod p  for some g (x). Since 
/  (rfl = 0 mod p for i = {1, ■ • ■ , k -  1}, we know (r, -  r&) g (r*) =  0 mod p. This 
implies p\ {n — rk) g (n). Because r, — #  0 mod p, since the roots are distinct, we get 
p\g (rj). T hat is to  say g (x) has roots {ri, • • • , rk-\} .  So by the induction hypothesis,
deg (g) >  A: — 1; therefore deg ( / )  > k .  □
L e m m a  15. Suppose ord (a) = r, ord{b) = s, and gcd (r, s) =  1. Then ord{ab) = rs.
Proof. Since a” =  1 mod p and 6"* =  1 mod p, we get [ab)'^  ^ = (a”)® {b^^ = 1 mod p. 
Suppose
{ab)^ =  1 mod p.
Then
(a6)^” =  6*’” =  1 mod p 
Since gcd (r, s) =  1, this implies s|A:. Similarly, we get r|A:. So, rs|A;; therefore rs < k. □
L e m m a  16. Let r =  max{ord{a) : a G Z*}. I f  b ^  Z* then ord{b) \r.
Proof. Suppose there exists b such th a t ord (6) fr .  Then there exists a prime p|ord (6) such
th a t p™|ord (6) but p”’ fr .  Let n  be the maximum integer such th a t p " |r  (so n < m)  and let
r  =  p"r. We were given there exists an o G Z* such th a t ord (a) = r. Let s = b = E,
and à = aP". Then ord (â) =  f, ord = p™, and the gcd(p™ ,r) =  1. So by Lemma 15, 
ord ( Û6 ) =  p”*r >  r , a contradiction. □
T h e o re m  17 (Prim itive Root). Every Z* has  a primitive root.
Proof. Let k = max{ord (a) : a  G Z*}. Then by Lemma 16, a*' =  1 mod p  for all a.  This 
implies /  (x) =  x*' — 1 has p — 1 roots. In turn . Lemma 14 implies k = deg ( / )  >  p — 1. Since 
aP~^ = 1 mod p for all a. A: =  p — 1. Therefore a primitive root exists for Z*. □
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We have established th a t a primitive root exists for Z*, bu t how many are there? Our 
next theorem will determine the number of primitive roots.
T h e o re m  18 (Number of Prim itive Roots). There are exactly 4>{p— l) primitive roots of
z;.
Proof. Let r  be an integer and suppose gcd {r,p — 1) = d and d > 1. Let p — 1 = dk  and 
r = rd. Then =  g'’(P“ P =  1 mod p. This implies ord (g”) <  p — 1. Thus there
are at most f>{p— 1) primitive roots.
Conversely, if gcd (r,p  — 1) =  1, then rx  +  (p — 1) g =  1. Thus (g”)  ^ =  1 mod p implies 
g r k x + { p - d k y  = g>^ = \  mod p. In tnrn , this implies p —  l \k  =  ord (g). Thus g” is a primitive 
root. □
We state  our next theorem to test for a primitive root rather than  using the naive approach 
of calculating a^ mod p for every /c =  {l , - -  - , p —1}.
p —  1
T h e o re m  19 (Primitive Root Test). Let a E Z* and q pnm,e. I f  a i ^ 1  mod p for  all 
q\p — 1. Then a is a generator.
p  — 1
Proof. Suppose a <> ^ 1  mod p for all g|p — 1. Let ord (a) = k, and suppose k < p ~ l .  By 
Lemma 16 &|p— 1. So p — 1 =  kt  for some ( G Z. Since k  /  p - 1, 1 >  1, so there is a prime q\t. 
But then t = qt' and a'**' =  1 mod p. This implies o . ^  =  1 mod p, a contradiction. □
Though primitive roots are plentiful, there is no simple m ethod to  decide whether a 
nnmber is a primitive root for a large prime. (To apply Theorem 4.1, we need to  factor p —1, 
which is difficult if p  — 1 has a large prime factor [12].) Once one is found though, the rest 
can easily be calculated using the formula g* mod p such th a t gcd (s, (p (p)) =  1. Let us look 
at an example; let us find the primitive roots of Z*y.
1. First, we find a primitive root.
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(a) First we start with g =  2 and determine if it is a generator.
2 ^  =  2® =  1 mod 17.
(b) Since 2 is not a generator, we m ust test again. Let us try  g — 3.
3 ^  =  3® =  16 #  1 mod 17.
So by Theorem 4.1, 3 is a primitive root.
2. We have established a generator, g =  3; so, how many are there?
(17 -  1) =  (16) =  2^ - 2® =  1 6 -  8 =  8
3. W hat are the generators?
(a) Since g =  3, the number of s relatively prime to (17) is 8, and they are s 
{1 ,3 ,5 ,7 ,9 ,11 ,13 ,15} .
(b) Using our formula, we calculate all the primitive roots:
3^  =  3 mod 17 
3® =  10 mod 17 
3® =  5 mod 17 
3  ^ =  11 mod 17 
3® =  14 mod 17
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3^  ^ =  7 mod 17 
3^ ® =  12 mod 17 
3®® =  6 mod 17
Thus the set of primitive roots for Z\-j is {3,5, 6, 7,10,11,12,14}.
As Table 4.1 suggests, it is best to s ta rt testing generators at 2 and work our way up. 
Regardless, we should not be fooled into believing th a t all least primitive roots are small; for 
example if p =  191, the smallest generator is g =  19 [4].
We started  this section with primitive roots so th a t we could analyze index calculus, 
leading us to our definition of index.
D e fin itio n  10 (Index). If r  is a primitive root of p and P  = a mod p, then k  is called the 
index of a relative to r, denoted by A: =  ind^a; hence
r =  a mod p. (4.1)
The properties of indices are very similar to  the properties of logarithms. The properties 
of indices are as follows, given r  is a primitive root of p:
1. m drab=  ind^a +  ind^è mod</>(p)
2. indr a* =  t ind^a mod cp (p)
3. indrl =  0 mod (p{p) and ind^r =  1 mod (p{p)
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Table 4.1: Primitive Roots for 1 < p < 100
Prime Nnmber of Generators Smallest Primitive Root
2 1 1
3 1 2
5 2 2
7 2 3
11 4 2
13 4 2
17 8 3
19 6 2
23 10 5
29 12 2
31 8 3
37 12 2
41 16 6
43 12 3
47 22 5
53 24 2
59 28 2
61 16 2
67 20 2
71 24 7
73 24 5
79 24 3
83 40 2
89 40 3
97 32 5
Proof. 1. By the definition of index we have:
r  =  a mod p
r =  b mod p
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If we multiply these two equations together, we get the following;
r  =  ab mod p
^ indra+ indrfc =  ^ indrob ^
^ indra+ ind^b- ind^ ab ^   ^ _
Recall th a t the order of r is (p), therefore
(j) (p) 1 indrtt +  indr6 — ind^aè 44» ind^a +  ind^b — ind^aô =  0 m od 4> (p)
44» indrO +  indr6 =  indr«6 mod (p (p ) .
2. By the definition of index we have;
r =  a* mod p
By the laws of exponents we have r* =  (r ‘"dra^ =  a* mod p, therefore again by 
the order of r we have:
indrO* 5  t indrtt mod (p (p ) .
3. Let k = indrl, so by definition we have = 1 mod p. Since A: is a multiple of (p{p),
we get A: =  0 mod (p (p).
Let k =  indrr, so by definition we have P  = r mod p or = 1 mod p. Since A; — 1
is a multiple of <p (p), we get A: =  1 mod </> (p). □
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EIG Cipher
Like the RSA cipher, the EIG is a public-key cryptosystem th a t uses large primes as a 
cipher, key exchange, or digital signature. However RSA’s security is in the quandary of 
factoring, where as E lG ’s secnrity lies in the difficulty of the discrete log problem. T hat is to 
say, the difficulty of solving for s in = y  mod p  given x, y and p (i.e. finding s = inda,g). 
Let us analyze how the EIG cipher works.
Theorem  20 (EIG Algorithm). Again, we break the algorithm into three parts: the key 
generation, the encryption process, and the decryption process.
1. The key generation:
(a) Choose a large prime, p (at least 100 digits).
(b) Choose on a  E Z* (preferably with a  a primitive rootf4j).
(c) Choose a random integer, a, such that 1 <  a <  p — 1.
(d) Compute j3 =  mod p.
(e) The public key is p, a, and (3. The private key is a.
2. Encryption:
(a) Bob obtains A lice’s public key p, a, and (3.
(b) Bob converts his message to an integer m , such that 0 <  m <  p —1. I f  the message 
is larger than p, it can be broken down into pieces such that each piece is within the 
range. However, each piece m i, m 2 , • • • , m, will have to be encrypted separately.
(c) Choose a random integer, k, such that 1 < k < p — 1. I f  the message is broken 
down into pieces m i, m 2 , ■ ■ ■ , m ,, then a different random k should be chosen fo r  
eocA TUi
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(d) Bob computes 7 =  0 *’ mod p.
(e) Bob computes 5 = m(3^ mod p.
(f) Bob sends the ciphertext, E  = (7 ,6) ,  to Alice.
3. Decryption:
(a) Alice receives the ciphertext E  from  Bob.
(b) Alice computes % =  7^“ ?““ =  7 ““ mod p
(c) Alice computes m  = 6x  mod p to decipher the text.
(d) Alice converts the integer into text.
Proof. ÔX =  ^7 “° =  = m  (« ““*') =  m  mod p  □
We have defined and proved th a t the EIG cipher works in theory. Let us dem onstrate 
the procedure with an example (but with a small prime).
1. The key generation:
(a) Alice chooses a small prime, p =  821. (For this dem onstration we will not choose 
a large prime.)
(b) Alice chooses a primitive root, o  =  2.
(c) Alice chooses a random integer, a =  10, such th a t 1 < a <  820.
(d) Alice computes ft = mod p, giving (3 = 2^ ® mod 821.
2  ^ =  2 mod 821
2  ^ =  4 mod 821
2^  =  16 mod 821 
2® =  256 mod 821
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This gives Alice 2^ ® =  2®+^  =  256 4 =  1024 =  203 mod 821. Thus =  203.
(e) The public key is p =  821, a  =  2, and (3 =  203. The private key is a =  10.
2. Encryption:
(a) Bob obtains Alice’s public key p =  821, a  =  2, and j3 — 203.
(b) Bob converts his message “Hi” to  an integer value using Table 4.2, thus m =  809.
(c) Bob chooses a random integer, k = 100, such th a t 1 <  A; <  820.
(d) Bob computes 7 =  a** mod p, giving 7 =  2 ®^® mod 821. Using the square-square 
m ethod Bob concludes 7 =  2^ ®® =  784 mod 821, thus 7 =  784.
(e) Bob computes 5 = m(3^ mod p, giving 5 =  809 • 203^°° mod 821. Again using 
the square-square m ethod Bob concludes 203^ ®® =  463 mod 821. Thus 5 = 809 • 
203^ ®® =  809 - 463 =  191 mod 821, so <^ =  191.
(f) Bob sends the ciphertext, E  =  (7 =  784, <5 =  191), to Alice.
3. Decryption:
(a) Alice receives the ciphertext E  from Bob.
(b) Alice computes % =  7^“ ?““ =  7 ““ mod p, giving % =  784821- 1-10 821. 
Using the square-square m ethod Alice concludes % =  784® °^ =  649 mod 821, 
thus X =  649.
(c) Alice computes m  = 5 \  mod p to decipher the tex t giving m  =  191 • 649 
mod 821. Thus m =  809.
(d) Alice uses Table 4.2 to  convert the message into text, thus getting 809 =  “HI” .
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Table 4.2: Integer Value Alphabet
A =  01 B =  02 C =  03 D =  04 E =  05 F =  06 G =  07 H =  08
1 =  09 J =  10 K =  11 L =  12 M =  13 N =  14 0  =  15 P =  16
Q =  17 R =  18 S =  19 T =  20 U =  21 V =  22 W =  23 X =  24
Y =  25 Z =  26
Security of EIG
Like the RSA cipher, it has been conjectured th a t the EIG cipher is safe to  use for public- 
key cryptography, if used properly [12]. E lG ’s security lies in the discrete log problem, the 
difficulty of solving for a in a “ =  j3 mod p. If we were to try  and break onr EIG cipher 
by using index calculus, the naive approach would be to  build an index table, which in our 
example above, requires 820 calculations. Let us look at a smaller example to  illustrate how 
it could be done.
1. Suppose we discover th a t an EIG public key is (p =  17, a  =  7, /3 =  10) and we want to 
break it.
2. Breaking Our Cipher:
(a) We first find a generator of From our previous work, we know 5 =  3.
(b) We calculate 3* mod 17, & =  {!,- -- ,p — 1}, to generate the following index table.
Table 4.3: Index Table for p =  17 and p =  3
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
indgu 16 14 1 12 5 15 11 10 2 3 7 13 4 9 6 8
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(c) We know p =  17, a  =  7, and P = 10. Thus 7“ =  10 mod 17. So we need to find
a:
ind37“ =  indglO mod 16 
a indVf =  indalO mod 16 
11a =  3 mod 16
(d) We now m ust solve 11a — 166 =  3 using the Euclidean algorithm.
16 =  11-1 +  5 
11 =  5 - 2  +  1 
5 =  1 -5 +  0
Working our way back we get 1 =  1 1 - 3 — 16-2.  If we multiply by 3, we get 
3 =  11 - 9 -  16-6.
(e) Therefore, the secret key is a =  9.
To break the cipher above, we generated an index table. Consequently if we choose a large 
p, say a t least 100 digits, it now becomes infeasible to try  to break the EIG cipher using this 
method. As with RSA, algorithms have been developed to  solve the discrete log problem for 
a large p (e.g. Shanks’s baby-step giant-step, Pollard’s p-method, Pohlig-Hellman method). 
The fastest of these methods, Pohlig-Hellman, still takes O {y/plogp) to  solve the discrete 
log problem [8]. Like RSA, the EIG cipher is resistant to  cryptanalysis, bu t vulnerable to 
side-channel attacks and cyber criminals.
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CH APTER 5 
ELLIPTIC CURVES
Both the RSA cipher and the EIG cipher have been in use for over twenty years and are 
considered first generation public-key cryptosystems. Both of these systems require large se­
cret keys (i.e. greater than  100 digits) to  m aintain the security of the information. Currently 
it is recommended to  use a key size of 1024-bits, over 300 digits, for RSA encryption. The 
next generation of public-key cryptography is elliptic curves over finite fields. The security 
of elliptic curve cryptography (EGG) lies in the elliptic curve discrete log problem. It is easy 
for us to  solve for Q m [ k ] P  = Q given k  and P, bu t extremely difficult to  calculate k given 
P  and Q. Like EIG, we use this as our basis. Thus, we make the elliptic curve E  defined 
over Fq and a point P  on E  public; Alice picks u and sends Bob [u] P , Bob picks v and sends 
Alice [u] P. Then, as with EIG, Alice and Bob can calculate [uv] P , their shared key. The 
biggest advantage of nsing EGG is key size. RSA requires a key of 1024-bits for security, 
whereas for EGG to provide the same security only requires a key size of 160-bits, less than  
50 digits. EGG is done over the finite field, F , where q = is large. Though the choice of 
q = 2^ is common, for simplicity we will restrict our attention to  q = p  with p  a large prime 
(50-100 digits).
Elliptic Gurves over the Reals 
To gain a working knowledge of EGG over F ,, we first must understand how elliptic curves 
perform over the reals. Elliptic curves are cubic curves of degree three in two variables chosen
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so th a t a line th a t intersects the curve at two points intersects the curve again a t a third 
(counting multiplicity). By a suitable change of variables, every elliptic curve over the reals 
is equivalent to  one in the form:
ax + h for some a, 6 G (5.1)
This is called the W eierstrass canonical form. We limit ourselves to  looking at only smooth 
curves; th a t is, curves where a tangent line can be found for any point on it. This reduces 
to  the condition 4a^ +  276^ /  0. A generic example is shown in Figure 5.1. Note th a t a line 
going through any two points on the curve generally intersects the curve at a th ird  point; 
the exception is if the line is vertical. To deal with the case of vertical lines, we add a point 
a t infinity.
Figure 5.1: An Elliptic Curve
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D efinition 11 (Point a t Infinity). Let O  be the point a t infinity th a t all vertical lines go 
through.
This definition can be made more precise by using projective geometry (See Koblitz [12, 
page 171]). We state  the following property of O  w ithout proof: O  is a point of inflection, 
meaning the tangent line a t O  intersects the curve again at O. We call all the points th a t 
satisfy Equation 5.1 plus the point O  a t infinity the curve E. We write E/M. or E/ ¥g  for a
curve E  defined over the field R or F^.
D efinition 12 {P * Q).  Snppose we are given two points, P  and Q on E.  We define P  * Q 
on E  as follows: We let P  * Q be the th ird  point of intersection of the line P Q  with E.  If 
P  = Q,  then we take the line to  be the tangent to  P  at P  (i.e. P  has a mnltiplicity of 2 or
3).
To better understand this definition, let us look at some examples. Let P  =  (xp,yp) ,
Q = {xQ,yQ), R  = {xR,yR),  and P  =  {xp, —yp).  We note the following:
1. 0 * 0  = 0 ,  since O  is a point of inflection.
2. P  * O = P  and P  * P  = O  (see Figure 5.2).
3. P  * Q = Q * P.
4. If P  * Q =  P , then P  * R  = Q and Q * R  = P  (see Figure 5.3).
5. l i Q  = P , we take the tangent line (see Figure 5.4). In this figure, note th a t P *  P  = R
and P  * R  = P.
D efinition 13 {P + Q).  Select a point on P; call it Ô.  We define P  + Q = { P * Q ) * 0 .
We traditionally choose O = O ior curves in W eierstrass canonical form. W ith this 
choice, it leads us directly to  our next theorem.
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Figure 5.2: — P  on an elliptic curve
T h e o re m  21 (Group Law). The set o f all points on E  (including O ) defines an abelian 
group with respect to addition.
We omit a complete proof. To prove this, we need to show the following:
1. Closure; If P, Q G P/M , then P  +  Q G P/M .
2. Associativity; For all P, Q, P  G P /M , {P + Q) + R  = P  + {Q + R).
3. Identity: There exists an element 0 G P /M  such th a t P  +  0 =  P  for all P  G P/M .
4. Inverses: For each P  G P/M , there exists —P  G P /M  such th a t P  +  ( —P ) =  0.
5. Com m utativity: P  +  Q =  Q +  P  for all P, Q G P/M .
Proof. Closure and com m utativity are clear (See Figures 5.2-5.4).
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Figure 5.3: Addition on an elliptic curve
• The additive identity (see Figure 5.2) is O,  since
f  +  0  =
=
=  p .
• The additive inverse (see Figure 5.2) —P  is P,  since
P  + P ^ { ^ P * P ] * 0  
=  0 * 0  
=  o .
From this point forward, we will use —P  = (xp,  —yp)  instead of P.
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[2]P
Figure 5.4: Point doubling on an elliptic curve
• Ironically, associativity is the difficult property to  prove (See Enge [8, pages 40-41] for 
a proof.). □
Since this is a group, we now can define point multiplication.
D e fin itio n  14 (Point M ultiplication). We set
[k]P = P  + P + - - -  + P  for & E N.
 ^ ' ------------------- V------------------- '
k t i m e s
Let us look at addition more closely.
1. Addition of two points when P  ^  Q:
(a) If Xp =  x q ,  then Q = —F , so F  4- (—F)  =  O  (see Figure 5.2).
(b) If Xp 7  ^ X q ,  let P  + Q = R  where R  — (xp,  yp)  (see Figure 5.3). We calculate R  
as follows:
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i. We first find the slope of the line through the points P  and Q:
^  ^  V Q - y p
Xq — Xp
ii. Next, we plug
y = \  { x -  xp) - \ - yp  (5.2)
into Equation 5.1. So, we have
(A (x — Xp)  +  y p Ÿ  = x^ +  ax +  6
0 =  x^ — x^A^ +  X ( 2 X ^ x p  — 2 X y p  +  a)
—A^Xp +  2 X x p y p  — y"p +  b.
We know the coefficient of x^ is the sum of the roots, A^  =  x p  + xq + xp.  
Thus
Xp = X^ — Xp — Xq .
hi. Finally, once we have Xp,  we plug it back into Equation 5.2 and change the 
sign to  get
1/A A ( X f  -  Xy{) -  2/p.
2. Addition of two points when P  = Q (i.e. Point Doubling):
(a) If yp =  0, then P  =  —F , so [2] P  = O.
(b) If 2/p 7  ^ 0, let [2] F  =  F  +  F  =  F  where R  = (xp,yp)  (see Figure 5.4). We
calculate R  as follows:
i. The line is the tangent a t xp. We get the slope using implicit differentiation
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on Equation 5.1. Thus we get
2yy = 3 x  + a]
so X = y' at {xp,yp) .  Therefore we get
^ 3xp +  a
ii. As before, is the sum of the roots, but X p  is a root with multiplicity 2, so
X p  =  X^ — 2 x p .
hi. Finally, once we have x p ,  we plug it and A into Equation 5.2 to  get
2/a =  A ( x p  — X p )  — y p .
Using these formulas, one can prove associativity but it is a long algebraic mess.
W hat is particularly nice about addition on E  is th a t it is entirely algebraic. Hence, these 
formulas hold even if we change the field. In particular, let us look at E  over F , (Note th a t 
we have to  calculate different algebraic formulas for P  +  Q if ç =  2’' or 3''; th is is why we 
avoid this case).
Elliptic Curves over F ,
Though addition on E  is defined geometrically (over M), the formulas are algebraic, thus 
they work over any held. To have a practical use in cryptography, we limit our held to  Fg 
where q = is large, p  is prime, and r  € N. W hen p =  2 or 3, the change of variables used
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to  get the canonical form in Equation 5.3 includes division by zero (and, as noted earlier, we 
have to  calculate different algebraic formulas). Over these fields, the canonical forms are:
1. 2/  ^+  xj/ =  +  ax^ +  6, if p =  2 and
2. + ax^ + bx + c, ii p  = 3.
There are also constraints on a and b similar to our earlier constraint 4a^ — 276^ /  0 [12]. 
Although the case of g — 2'' is common because it lends itself nicely to  binary, our attention 
is on when p is a large prime and r  =  1. Thus, from this point forward we assume th a t
our held, Fp, satishes the condition th a t p  is a large prime (r =  1). Therefore with minor
adjustm ents to  equation 5.1 we have:
y “^ = x^ + ax + b mod p (5.3)
where a, b , x , y  E Fp and 4a^ +  276^ ^  0 mod p. Let us look at an elementary example over
F 23 with a — 1 and 6 =  2.
1. Note 4a^ +  276^ =  4 • +  27 • 2  ^ =  4 +  108 =  112 =  20 ^  0 mod 23.
2. Note th a t P  = (0, 5), Q = (8 ,4),  R  =  (0,18), and S  = (10, 0) all lie on E.  Let us hud
the following:
(a) P  + R.  Because xp =  0 =  Xp we have:
P  + R  = 0 .
(b) P  + Q.  Because xp =  0 7^  xq =  8 we have:
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i =  X Q - x p  p :
4 - 5  
A =  -— -  mod 23 
8 - 0
A =  22 • 8“  ^ mod 23 
A =  22 • 3 mod 23 
A =  20 mod 23
ii. xg =  A —  Xp —  X q  mod p:
Xg =  20^ — 0 — 8 mod 23 
xg =  400 — 8 mod 23 
xg =  1 mod 23
iii- 2/3 =  A (xp — Xg )  — yp mod p:
2/g =  20 • (0 — 1) — 5 mod 23
2/g =  (20 • — 1) — 5 mod 23
2/g =  —25 mod 23
2/3 =  21 mod 23
Thus P  +  Q =  (1,21).
(c) [2] S.  Because ys = 0 we have:
[2] g  =  O.
(d) [2] P.  Because yp ^  0 we have:
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\ 3x p T  a 11. A =  — ----- mod p:^yp
A =  (3 • 0  ^+  1) • (2 • 5)-^ mod 23 
A =  1 ■ 10“  ^ mod 23 
A =  1 • 7 mod 23 
A =  7 mod 23
ii. X2 =  A^  — 2xp  mod p:
X2 =  7  ^ — 0 • 1 mod 23 
X2  =  49 mod 23 
X2  = 3 mod 23
iii. 2/2 =  A (xp — X2 ) — yp mod p:
2/2 =  7 • (0 — 3) — 5 mod 23 
2/2 =  (7 • —3) — 5 mod 23 
2/2 =  —26 mod 23 
2/2 =  20 mod 23
Thus [2] F  =  (3,20).
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Security of ECC over Fp
As we stated  before, ECC basically uses the same idea as EIG. The security of ECC lies in 
the discrete log problem. It is easy for us to  calculate [k\P = Q given k  and P,  bu t extremely 
difficult to  calculate k  given P  and Q. W hen we use ECC there are param eters th a t must 
be agreed upon before starting; they are Fp, the elliptic curve to  be used (i.e. a and b such 
th a t 4a^ +  276^ ^  0 mod p), and a base point P  G F /F p . To ensure the security, we choose 
p, a prime between 50-100 digits. Since these param eters do not have to  be random  and 
can be checked by others, they can be agreed upon in advance. Let us look at a simplified 
dem onstration of how ECC works.
1. Alice and Bob agree on p, Fp, y'  ^ = + ax + h mod p and P  € E/¥p.
2. Alice chooses a random integer u  such th a t 1 <  u <  p — 1.
(a) She computes [u] P  = Q.
(b) She makes Q public and keeps u secret.
3. Bob chooses a random  integer v such th a t 1 <  u <  p — 1.
(a) He computes [u] P  = R.
(b) He makes R  public and keeps v secret.
4. Alice and Bob compute S  =  [uu] P,  their shared secret key to  be used in an existing 
symmetric-key cryptographic system.
Each E/Fp  generates a number of points, call it TV. Although we do not need to  know 
the value of TV to implement our system, to  ensure the security of it, we choose an E / ¥p  
such th a t TV is not a product of small primes. Various methods exist for computing TV (See 
Koblitz for techniques [12, page 183]), however we are assuming th a t our TV is not a product
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of small primes. The next critical step in our system is the choice of P.  As long as P  ^  O,  
it will generate a subgroup of E/¥p.  We choose P  such th a t the order is almost as large as 
N.  To ensure th a t our choice of P  is acceptable, we choose E/ ¥ p  such th a t F  is a prime 
[12, page 184]. Thus by our choices we have made the elliptic curve discrete log problem the 
most formidable and labor intensive making our system secure.
All the public-key ciphers we have studied are considered hard to  break. W hat makes 
ECC attractive is the relatively small key size (i.e. the complexity to  break the cipher). 
In Chapter 4, we studied EIG and the difficulty of the discrete log problem. Like EIG, 
ECC is defined over a finite field. W ith the discrete log problem over a finite field we were 
able to  define the field with respect to addition and multiplication. W ith the elliptic curve 
discrete log problem over a finite field we only defined a group with respect to  addition. This 
difference between the two problems is what makes ECC more arduous [8, pages 118-124].
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CH APTER 6 
CONCLUSION
Although our discussion has focused on asymmetric-key cryptography, it is often not used 
as the sole source of encryption for communication. Public-key cryptography is generally used 
in a cipher suite. A cipher suite consists of:
1. Asymmetric-key cryptographic systems used for key-exchange protocol and digital sig­
natures. (e.g. RSA, EIG, ECC)
2. Symmetric-key cryptographic systems used for secure communications, (e.g. AES, 
Advance Encryption Standard; DES, D ata Encryption Standard)
3. One-way hash functions used for connection integrity, (e.g. SHA, Secure Hash Algo­
rithm; MD5, Message Digest algorithm)
A cipher suite is commonly used for secure communications over the internet in the handshake 
protocol. The protocol can be summarized in the following steps:
1. ClientHello: A user connects to  a server presenting a list of cryptographic systems 
supported by the user’s system.
2. Server Hello: The server chooses the cryptographic systems to be used and informs the 
user of the decision.
3. ServerCertificate: The server sends its digital certificate to  the user certified by a 
trusted  th ird  party.
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4. ClientKeyExchange; The user chooses a random number (prem aster secret), encrypts 
it with the server’s public-key, and sends it to  the server. Both the user and server 
generate the m aster secret from the prem aster secret.
5. ChangeCipherSpec: User (server) informs the server (user) everything will be encrypted 
from this point forward.
6. Finish: User (server) sends hash function for verification.
We have studied three asymmetric cryptographic systems and the m athem atics th a t make 
them  work. Currently first generation ciphers require the generation of very large secret keys 
to  ensure the security of the information. The next generation of public-key ciphers, elliptic 
curve cryptography, dram atically reduced the size of the secret key as well as increased the 
security level. Although cracking ECC keys is considered infeasible for large primes, we 
cannot guarantee how long this will last. Recently a company in Canada, D-Wave, produced 
a working quantum  computer albeit only 16-qubit. This model is no faster than  today’s 
digital computers and still lacks the efficiency to  perform discrete logarithms and factoring 
large numbers. However, D-Wave plans to  have a 1024-qubit computer operational by the 
end of 2008 [7]. This very well could tu rn  the world of public-key cryptography upside down. 
If this were to  happen, we would need to speed up the research into quantum  cryptography. 
Quantum  computing and quantum  cryptography share the same basis of laws in quantum  
mechanics but, quantum  cryptography does not require quantum  computing. If history has 
taught us one thing about secret codes, it is once one is implemented there is someone out 
there trying to  break it.
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